American’s latest persistent political puzzle

by Jack Stapleton, Jr.

Trying to understand the political-economic-social problems now facing the United States in dealing with post-war Iraq and its 22.7 million Muslim residents, is like trying to comprehend how the corrupt Pendergast machine in 1930s’ Kansas City could produce statesmen such as Harry Truman. Both of these subjects defy whatever logic can be found in contemporary politics. Both run contrary to any rational prediction of how history will record the outcome.

America’s military planners have sought to anticipate the post-war society in a country that had twice within a period of 13 years been targeted for military defeat by the United States and, to a degree, a significant number of the world’s constitutional governments. Today, as chaos takes over the charred remains of Iraq’s ruling Baath party, coalition forces are both surprised and baffled by the turmoil that has erupted within the conquered Middle Eastern nation. The White House, the departments of Defense and State and those members of Congress whose views were solicited before March 20 are fumbling around for explanations.

The question now facing the world, and particularly the United States, is simply what kind of a new Iraq can be built on the foundation of the old? For this nation has a history extending over 5,000 years and is founder of what became the region’s most important city and a center for scholarship and philosophy. Endowed with hospitals and mosques, adorned with palaces and gardens, the Baghdad of the “Arabian Nights” was a site of transition and transformation.

The British have a longer history in the Arab world than most nations. Following World War I, they attempted to secure an even greater presence, a goal that could have been realized had it not been for the stalwart opposition of Mesopotamia (the pre-modern name for Iraq) finally abandoning the region after lacking the resources and the motivation to remain. On its own, the Arab centerpiece became a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament. The result was only political instability that would plague the country which had sought stability through the creation of the Baath Party. The Baath Party was assigned the duty of governing through traditional secularism but changed direction to conform to others in the Middle East.

Expediency increasingly became the mantra of the Baath Party. It sought to inaugurate change in spite of adamant opposition from nations in a once-strong Pan-Arab community, creating problems for Muslim nations and their remarkable lack of enthusiasm for counteracting religious domination.

The history of contemporary Iraq is usually viewed as the tale of a single tyrant, Saddam Hussein.

But it is also the story of an ideology. That concept is pan-Arab nationalism, and the ideology that gave it form in Iraq, and in Syria, is Baathism. From its founding in Damascus by French-educated intellectuals during the 1940s, the party espoused doctrines that would guide and inspire both Iraqi and Syrian leaders.

The quest for Arab unity led to wars of conquest, freedom became oppression, while socialism descended into equalized poverty. Hussein may be gone, at least from office, but the pan-Arab and Baath legacies remain forces which anyone contemplating the future of Iraq will be forced to resolve. The prominence of the Baath Party in Iraq is unique, since members are often accused of snooping into neighboring countries’ politics and trying to influence policy decisions. Taking turn about, the Iraqis introduced major changes in Baath ideology, especially after Hussein assumed the presidency in 1979.

Baath Party leaders envisaged a united Arab state, founded on religious principles, with all earlier Arab states and people dissolved into one central pan-Arab grouping. The Iraqi people, Saddam and his court ideologues argued, could never dissolve and disappear. The Iraqi nation has been born many generations before; it had established the earliest and greatest civilization on earth, culminating in the Baath regime. Iraq was destined for greatness it would lead the whole Arab world. For the foreseeable future, therefore, it would be more important to pursue Iraqi interests than to sacrifice Iraq on the altar of Arab causes. Naturally, the new theory did not have much appeal to its surrounding neighbors.

After Hussein took over the reins, any shred of respect for human rights or other democratic values that had survived earlier Baath Party rule disappeared within a short time. Party membership was made compulsory for Iraqis in important positions. By joining, they accepted political and security limitations, including some that promised a death sentence if violated. By 1989 the number of party members had expanded to 1.5 million, but the privileged rank (one of four ranks of membership) remained strictly controlled, not exceeding 25,000. Many left the party when the last vestiges of democracy had disappeared.

It is important for Americans, anxious to see rapid democratic growth among the 18 nations in the Arab world, to realize there is not a single elected president who does not have control over national legislatures. Most of these leaders have the right to reject any policies advanced by democratic means. Virtually all, including Iraq, control basic freedoms and are active and persistent theocracies.

Let us hope that the world crisis created by our own government does not see the realization of an ancient saying, “The real problems begin when you finally get what you’ve always wanted.”

[Missouri News & Editorial Services, Inc. Copyright (C) 2003 MNES Corp.]